Reflections on the contributions of lawyers to tax policy-making in New Zealand by Sawyer AJ
1
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF LAWYERS TO TAX 
POLICY-MAKING IN NEW ZEALAND
(2017) 27(4) (December) New Zealand Universities Law Review Forthcoming
ADRIAN SAWYER∗
Lawyers play an important part in tax policy-making in New Zealand (NZ).  This 
paper briefly reviews NZ’s Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP), and then turns its
focus on the important contributions legal practitioners and academics can make 
to tax policy development.  Data has been gathered concerning the contributions 
of NZ lawyers who are, or have been, tax policymakers, law makers, submitters and 
commentators.  This paper also notes the limited instances where legal and other 
theoretical approaches to tax policy have been incorporated into tax policy-making 
design in NZ, including novel tax policy design, such as the concept of the Broad 
Base Low Rate (BBLR) structure.  It concludes that lawyers have made a valuable,
but not necessarily distinctive, contribution to tax policy development in NZ.  Also, 
to provide context, the paper compares the NZ approach to tax policy with that of 
the Republic of Ireland.
I. INTRODUCTION
New Zealand (NZ) is frequently promoted as a leader in tax policy design, reflected in 
part through its innovative Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP), introduced in 1994 
following a review of NZ’s Inland Revenue (IR).  Specifically, the GTPP promotes 
consultation and transparency, and features an almost unparalleled environment where 
officials and practitioners work together in the wider interest of better tax policy and 
legislation.  
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How is this achieved?  First, the GTPP encourages early and explicit consideration of key 
tax policy elements and trade-offs as part of its Strategic, Tactical and Operational phases. 
Secondly, the GTPP provides an opportunity for external input into the process for 
formulating tax policy to increase both the actual and perceived transparency of the 
process, and provide for greater contestability and quality of policy advice between the 
IR and NZ Treasury.  External consultation can occur at the initial stage of policy 
consideration, the detailed design stage, the legislative drafting phase, the select 
committee stage and the post-implementation review. Thirdly, the GTPP sets out to 
clarify the responsibilities and accountabilities of the two major departments actively 
involved in the process.  While much of the work in tax policy-making is undertaken by 
members of the accounting profession, the contributions of the legal profession during 
all of the phases of the GTPP are significant and vital to the success of tax policy 
development and implementation in NZ.  
With this background, the paper uses NZ as a case study to explore the contributions of 
lawyers to tax policy development.  Case study as a research method is often maligned 
and considered to be a non-scientific approach to undertaking research. Notwithstanding 
this view, case study research is used extensively in academic enquiry in traditional social 
science disciplines as well as practice-oriented fields.   When adopting a case study 
approach, the design and analysis considerations are of prime importance, more so often 
than the description of events or the scenario under review.  As Yin states the need for a 
case study arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena and allows 
investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.1
As a consequence of this paper taking the case study approach, the findings will not 
necessarily be directly transferrable to another jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the findings
should be indicative of what may be expected when lawyers in a particular jurisdiction 
have a significant level of involvement in a transparent and consultative tax policy 
process. In this regard, the paper does seek to briefly compare NZ to that of the Republic 
of Ireland, a nation with a relatively small population similar to that of NZ (Ireland’s 
population in 2017 is 4.7 million, with NZ’s being 4.8 million in 2017).  Both Ireland and 
NZ are small open economies, with a Westminster-type parliamentary process.  One 
  
1 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 2nd ed. Vol. 5, 2003).
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important difference is that Ireland is also accountable to the European Parliament 
through its membership of the European Union (EU).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In section II, the paper briefly 
reviews the development of the GTPP, building on prior research (for which the writer
has been a contributor).  It then extends this review in section III to focus on the important 
contributions legal practitioners and academics have made to tax policy development in 
NZ.  These contributions encompass, but are not limited to, preparation of submissions 
on behalf of law firms and the NZ Law Society (NZLS), membership of key committees 
(such as the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee - FEC), as well as officials within 
the NZ Treasury and IR.  Data, where it is publicly available, has been gathered on the 
contributions of lawyers who are policymakers, law makers, submitters and 
commentators.  Section IV then explores the limited instances where the writer is aware 
of legal and other theoretical approaches having been incorporated into tax policy-making 
design in NZ.  This includes tax policy design using the Broad Base Low Rate (BBLR)2
principle.  Following this discussion the paper briefly overviews the tax policy process 
in Ireland in section V, with a number of conclusions and areas for future research set out 
in section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE TAX POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN NEW ZEALAND
In this section of the paper, the writer sets out a summary of the experience of the GTPP 
in NZ. It commences with an outline of the GTPP, with a brief explanation of how it 
operates, and a comment on its utilisation and influence on tax policy development.  
Underlying the tax policy process in NZ is an environment based on transparency and 
genuine open consultation.
As commented elsewhere by the writer,3 NZ chose to take a new and innovative route in 
the mid-1990s with the adoption of the GTPP, a blueprint for formulating tax policy that 
  
2 For further analysis of the BBLR, see a presentation by IR’s Acting Deputy Commissioner (Policy and 
Design), D Carrigan, “Tax administration reform – retaining a coherent tax policy framework through 
change”, (paper presented to the NZ Inland Revenue Tax Administration Conference, 12-13 June 2014).  
For a broader discussion, see Richard Bird, The BBLR Approach to Tax Reform in Emerging Countries
(August 2008); available on SSRN at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273818&mirid=1.
3 See Adrian Sawyer, “Reviewing Tax Policy Development in New Zealand: Lessons from a Delicate 
Balancing of ‘Law and Politics’”, (2013) 28(2) Australian Tax Forum 401, at 408.
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is premised on transparency and consultation. The GTPP emerged following a review of 
the IR (known as the Organisational Review of Inland Revenue), chaired by Rt. Hon. Sir 
Ivor Richardson, former President of the NZ Court of Appeal.4 Sir Ivor Richardson 
identified a number of problems with the previous process for developing tax policy in 
NZ, noting that5:
… the subject matter is complex, and tax legislation is very complex and 
difficult to understand. The tax policy process was not clear, neither were the 
accountabilities for each stage of the process. There was insufficient external 
consultation in the process.
The GTPP was subsequently implemented by a Cabinet directive as a form of 
administrative or customary practice, rather than formally by way of legislation or 
regulation. This approach reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the GTPP.6 The 
GTPP’s influence on tax policy design is in stark contrast to the policy environment prior 
to 1994.  Tax policy was characterised by an absence of clarity and ascertainable 
accountabilities during each stage of the process. It was also largely controlled by the 
Minister of Finance and key Officials, with the perception that the external consultation 
was insufficient to the extent of being virtually ineffective.7
With the GTPP, the NZ Government and Policy Officials are able to draw upon the 
technical and practical expertise of the business community, along with incorporating the 
compliance and administrative effects of potential policy changes. Furthermore, the 
GTPP provides a mechanism to communicate the rationale for policy changes which 
assists with educating taxpayers about the need for the change and its wider implications. 
The GTPP has five core stages, each of which has their own components totalling 16 
phases (see Figure 1). The subject matter of reform is almost always firmly entrenched 
  
4 Rt. Hon. Sir Ivor Richardson, Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue Department, Report to the 
Minister of Revenue and the Minister of Finance, (Inland Revenue, April 1994). Sir Ivor Richardson was 
also instrumental in his oversight of the Rewrite Advisory Panel that worked alongside the NZ 
Government’s fourteen year project to rewrite the Income Tax Act; for an analysis see Adrian Sawyer, 
“RAP(ping) in Taxation: A Review of New Zealand’s Rewrite Advisory Panel and its Potential for 
Adaptation to Other Jurisdictions”, (2008) 37(3) Australian Tax Review, 148.
5 See Richardson, n 4 above, at 5.
6 See Sawyer, n 3 above, at 403.
7 See Sawyer, n 3 above, at 403.
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in the government of the time’s economic, fiscal and revenue strategies (Phases 1–3). A 
further feature of the GTPP is the requirement for the NZ Government to announce 
annually its Rolling Three Year Work Programme (RTYWP),8 which in turn leads to the 
annual work and resource plan of the IR. The GTPP contains a number of external inputs 
and feedback loops, including a post implementation of legislation review. Throughout 
the GTPP, the linkages and feedback loops are intended to reflect a flexible process that 
recognizes that some activities may occur simultaneously or in a slightly modified order, 
such as when legislative drafting may occur (within Phases 6–12). Phases 9-14 are part 
of the parliamentary process and were in place long before the GTPP was developed.  
  
8 The latest RTYWP is available at the IR’s Policy Advice Division’s website at: 
http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/work-programme, (at 18 November 2016).
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The NZ Government was encouraged by Sir Ivor Richardson’s Organisational Review 
Committee to adopt the GTPP (as set out in Figure 1) as a significant improvement over 
the then incumbent approach to tax policy-making based upon three key features the 
GTPP would offer.10 First, the GTPP clarifies the responsibilities and accountabilities of 
the two major departments actively involved in the process (namely the IR and the NZ 
Treasury). Second, the GTPP encourages earlier and more explicit consideration of key 
tax policy elements and trade-offs through the linking of its first three stages. Finally, the 
GTPP provides an opportunity for external input (such as from legal practitioners and 
firms) into the process for formulating tax policy.  This is intended to facilitate both the 
actual and perceived transparency of the process, and provide for greater contestability 
and quality of policy advice.  
For the most part, consultation under the GTPP is principally with tax practitioners on 
bills and consultative documents, and in this regard, tax lawyers will normally be active 
in preparing responses.  The form of consultation, however, may be adapted depending 
upon what is being consulted.  For example, consultation may involve large public 
meetings (such as for the reform of the taxation of charities) or the use of an online forum 
and blogs (for example, with changes to the student loans scheme).  When the tax 
treatment of indigenous authorities was consulted upon, regional hui (a form of traditional 
meeting held by Māori) were organised using indigenous networks.11
An important weakness in the GTPP is that late policy or legislative developments may 
be added by way of a Supplementary Order Paper (SOP)12 during the parliamentary 
phase.  With a SOP, the underlying policy of the proposed amendment is usually not 
exposed to public scrutiny via formal consultation. While this may not necessarily be a 
problem where the change is remedial and corrective of minor defects in existing 
legislation,13 if significant new developments are introduced, this is a major concern.  
  
10 See Sawyer, n 3 above, at 404.
11 For further discussion, see Sally-Ann Joseph, “Public consultation in tax policy: lessons for Singapore 
and Hong Kong”, (2016) 9(3) Journal of Asian Public Policy, 291.
12 An SOP is a late legislative amendment introduced by the Government at the Second Reading stage 
(during Step 13 in the GTPP) after the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) has reported on the bill 
(that is, after the consultation process has been completed). Usually these will be remedial and minor in 
nature, but this is not always the case. 
13 See Sawyer, n 3 above, at 404.
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Such actions effectively bypass the GTPP, leading to lower quality legislation (technical 
content and drafting).14
So why has the GTPP managed to survive?  The writer has previously reviewed the prior 
literature on the GTPP, and examined why it has been both successful and managed to 
survive the political policy environment that operates in NZ.15 One important element 
has been the GTPP’s adaptability to change to the various approaches to political policy 
development in NZ, as well as general acceptance of its merits from MPs across the 
political spectrum.  Furthermore, the private sector has continued to operate in a 
cooperative manner with Officials, with a view of ensuring the underlying policy is likely 
to meet is aims and be effective in practice. It is of note that the private sector and 
Officials in the IR have close links, with Officials making themselves readily accessible 
to tax practitioners. 
When the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) political system commenced in 1996, 
shortly after adoption of the GTPP in 1994, this was initially expected (at least) to provide 
a challenge to the operation of the GTPP.16  When the GTPP was introduced, NZ had a 
First Past the Post (FPP)17 election system for its single house Parliament (the House of 
Representatives). The evidence post the introduction of MMP indicates that it has not 
prevented major tax reform in NZ, with the Tax Working Group (TWG) in 2009-2010 
complementing the contributions of the GTPP to tax policy development in NZ with the 
most significant tax reform for New Zealand in 25 years. Nevertheless, it has necessitated 
greater compromise in tax policy negotiations between political parties.  The 
contributions of the TWG are discussed further in section III of this paper.
  
14 A significant example of introducing a major tax policy change via a SOP was the introduction of Loss 
Attributing Companies (LTCs) in 2011; see further the comments of Peter Vial, “The Generic Tax Policy 
Process: A “Jewel in Our Policy Formation Crown”?”, (2012) 25(2) NZULR 318–346. 
15 See Sawyer, n 3 above, at 404–425.
16 A feature of the MMP system has been (minority) coalition governments, with the major party needing 
to work closely with several other smaller parties to develop tax policy.
17 FFP is a system whereby the person who receives the highest number of votes for their electorate seat 
will win that seat. The party with the highest number of electorate seats will then be asked to form a 
government. If that party has more than 50 per cent of the electorate seats then it can become the 
government without needing to form a collation with one or more additional parties. Usually a government 
would be formed by a single political party that held a majority of electoral seats.
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Turning now to the platform for tax policy setting in NZ, it is important to recognise that 
NZ’s BBLR18 approach was introduced in the mid-1980s by then Minister of Finance, 
(Sir) Roger Douglas, prior to the implementation of the GTPP.  The BBLR is a coherent 
tax policy framework that seeks to appropriately balance (with trade-offs) a number of 
factors: efficiency; fairness; compliance costs; and administration costs.  It aims to have 
a broad base of taxation while keeping tax rates as low as possible.  NZ collects the bulk 
of its tax revenue from three broad bases; personal income, company income and 
consumption.  This has allowed a low top individual tax rate of 33 percent, which is 
aligned with trust rate and close to the 28 percent company rate.
The NZ Treasury comments with respect to BBLR in NZ:19
The best evidence available suggests that the BBLR framework is the optimal 
approach to tax policy for New Zealand in the medium-term. This framework 
aims to improve economic efficiency (and ultimately enhance economic 
growth performance) by reducing the distortions to economic decision-
making caused by taxes. The BBLR framework achieves this by employing 
extensive tax bases and applying low tax rates to those bases in order to reduce 
the behavioural distortions caused by the tax system as far as possible. In other 
words the BBLR framework aims to make tax a neutral factor in decisions, so 
that decisions can be made based on their underlying economic merit rather 
than being influenced by tax considerations. The BBLR framework attempts 
to do this while at the same time raising the revenue required to fund 
government expenditures (and striking a balance between the associated 
taxpayer compliance and Inland Revenue administration costs incurred to 
achieve this revenue objective). High tax rates are inconsistent with the BBLR 
  
18 For further discussion on BBLR, including its endorsement by the TWG, see Tax Working Group, A Tax 
System for New Zealand’s Future: Final Report (VUW, 2010), at 14; available at: 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg.  More generally on the BBLR, see OECD, Choosing a Broad 
Base - Low Rate Approach to Taxation, (OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 19, 2010).
19 See NZ Treasury, Regulatory Impact Statement: Changes to Personal Tax, the Research & Development 
Tax Credit and KiwiSaver: Status Quo and Problem Nature and magnitude of the problems with current 
personal tax settings, Taxation (Urgent Measures and Annual Rates) Bill (2009); available at:
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/ris/treasury/prk/03.htm (emphasis added).  
For further discussion on NZ’s approach to tax policy, see Matt Benge, “Formalising Good Tax Policy 
Practice: the New Zealand Model”, (paper presented at the Structures, Processes and Governance in Tax 




tax policy framework, which seeks to minimise the economic harm caused by 
taxes. While pursuing a BBLR framework, other factors such as equity and 
the tax system’s redistributive role are also taken into account in tax policy 
design.
The BBLR model is essentially a simple, easily understandable and coherent framework
that acts as a reference point for guiding tax policy development.  As a consequence it 
means that all significant areas of the economy should be taxed reasonably consistently
and therefore the resulting tax policy should reduce economic distortions.  The key 
aspects should be capable of being understood by the public, and its overall simplicity 
and coherence has enabled it be durable.  However, the BBLR has some ‘deficiencies’, 
although most are theoretical in nature.  For instance, economic theory would argue that
the most efficient mechanism to raise revenue would be to apply different tax rates to 
each taxpayer depending on their individual elasticities. The BBLR does not do this, and 
as such, is an example of where pragmatism outweighs economic theory. The BBLR also 
does not correct for positive and negative externalities to the extent that traditional 
economic theory would advocate. From a practical implementation perspective, one 
major deficiency of the BBLR base in NZ is the absence of a comprehensive capital gains 
tax (CGT).  Whether NZ should move down the path of developing and implementing a 
comprehensive CGT is a contentious issue politically.20
With growing evidence of increasing inequality in New Zealand, as well as increasing 
calls for governments to be more proactive in influencing the behaviour and decision-
making of individuals, the time is ripe for a comprehensive debate over whether BBLR 
remains the ‘best’ approach for NZ.  Issues such as responsive regulation, addressing 
environment concerns, resetting residential house prices, are in urgent need of informed 
debate.  While the author believes the BBLR has served NZ relatively well in terms of 
tax policy development compared to many other countries, the evidence of its ‘casualties’ 
provides impetus for informed debate, such as through the establishment of a working 
group similar to the TWG.
  
20 For a recent contribution to the debate over a CGT in NZ, see the special issue of the NZJTLP (2015) 
Vol 21(1).
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It is certainly an arguable contention that any novel policy development ultimately an 
illusion if one accepts it can be no more than a pretence that policymakers will be 
influenced by external input and be willing to be transparent in their decision-making. 
The author would suggest that NZ’s GTPP, coupled with the BBLR platform, comes 
close to avoiding being termed an illusion.  While key personnel within the IR remain 
receptive to consultation and generally act with transparency, there are limits to this.  In 
effect, through the prevailing government ideology, coupled with the Treasury’s strong 
preference for neoliberalism, it is difficult for the IR to resist displaying being dogmatic 
and doctrinaire adherence to neoliberalism, in general, and BBLR, in particular.  The IR 
would need convincing to depart form BBLR, although the absence of a CGT regime 
might suggest they can accept a less than optimal form of BBLR.  The author accepts that 
in principle a capital gain is income, at least from a theoretical perspective.  It should not 
be lost in this discussion, however, that a CGT remains a ‘political football’.  
Apart from the work of the TWG, the GTPP has not been tested in an environment of 
fundamental tax policy change.  Outside of taxation, the GTPP formed the basis for a 
much wider form of policy development, the Generic Policy Development Process 
(GPDP), implemented from 2005.21  Reference to, and use of, the GPDP ceased several 
years ago, without any apparent replacement policy development process.
Outside of NZ, how has the GTPP been perceived?  Dirkis and Bondfield22 argue that the 
GTPP is “as good as it gets” in the tax policy arena, taking into account the level of 
resources available to NZ.  These authors also suggest that there is much for other 
countries, including Australia, to learn and adapt from NZ’s GTPP experience.  The 
authors conclude:23
The standard of New Zealand openness is exemplified by Inland Revenue 
posting its briefing to the incoming Minister; in Australia, these are more 
likely to find themselves on a quick trip to the shredder rather than the web. 
In this regard, Australia still awaits the release of a report on an assessment of 
  
21 See Ministry of Economic Development (MED), Origin and Objectives of the GPDP (NZ Government, 
12 December 2005); available from http://www.med.govt.nz.
22 Michael Dirkis, and Brett Bondfield, “At the Extremes of a “Good Tax Policy Process”: A Case Study 
Contrasting the Role Accorded to Consultation in Tax Policy Development in Australia and New Zealand”, 
(2011) 11(2) NZJTLP 250.
23 See MED, n 21 above, at 275 (emphasis added).
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world best practice consultative tax policy practices commissioned by the 
Board of Taxation.
Little et al., as part of the Canadian tax policy forum, offer insights into the GTPP from 
both IR and practitioner perspectives.24  The authors highlight the extensive cooperation 
and trust between the private and public sectors in NZ.  In this regard, they suggest that 
private sector practitioners (including lawyers), on occasions, will advocate for changes 
that are not necessarily in their own (or their clients’) direct financial interests.25  Rather, 
they may take a view to support what is considered to be best for ‘New Zealand Inc.” (or 
NZ as a whole).  Little et al. also comment on major private sector organisations often 
initiating policy changes with Officials and suggesting modifications to proposals to 
facilitate their effective operation.26  Little et al. acknowledge that the GTPP is closely 
entwined with the political environment of NZ, along with the tax policy framework 
reflected in the BBLR.
Arnold offers the following overview of the strengths and weaknesses of NZ’s GTPP:27
The strengths of the New Zealand process for making tax policy are: 
• the participation of private-sector tax professionals in the process on both 
a formal and an informal basis;
• the open access to Inland Revenue tax policy officials and the minister 
accorded to tax professionals;
• the shared responsibility for tax policy and cooperation between the 
Treasury and Inland Revenue;
  
24 Stuart Little, Geoff D Nightingale, and Alan Fenwick, “Development of Tax Policy in New Zealand: 
The Generic Tax Policy Process”, (2013) 61(4) Canadian Tax Journal/Revue Fiscale Canadienne, 1043.  
The authors are from the NZ Treasury and a Big 4 Accounting firm.
25 Little et al., n 24 above, at 1050.
26 Little et al., n 24 above, at 1051.
27 Brian Arnold, “The Process of Making Tax Policy: Summary of Proceedings”, (2013) Vol 61(4) 
Canadian Tax Journal/Revue Fiscale Canadienne, 989, at 996.
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• the integration of the broad policy, legislative design, and drafting 
functions, coupled with a tight legislative process, which results in a tax 
policy process that is fast and certain; and
• the publication each year by Inland Revenue of its work program for the 
next 18 months, so that the public is notified on an ongoing basis of the tax 
issues that the government considers to be important.
The weaknesses of the New Zealand process are the following:
• the resources devoted to tax policy are shrinking at a time when demands 
on tax policy officials are increasing; as a result, insufficient strategic 
thinking occurs with respect to tax policy and fewer foreign consultants are 
used;
• there is insufficient post-implementation review of tax measures; and
• consultation on proposed tax measures limited to the New Zealand tax 
community is increasingly inadequate in a global economy.
Arnold concludes his commentary concerning NZ’s tax policy process by noting that:28
New Zealand’s situation is so special in many respects (and not just because 
of the country’s small population) that its GTPP is not readily transferable to 
other countries. Nevertheless, it was suggested that it would be worthwhile to 
develop model or best practices with respect to the institutionalization of the 
relationships among the principal players in the tax policy process.
Little et al. conclude favourably on the GTPP, stating:29
Tax policy works fairly well in New Zealand. An important reason is the 
formalized GTPP process, which encourages consultation early and often in 
the development of tax policy.  
  
28 Arnold, n 27 above, at 1007 (emphasis added).
29 Little et al., n 24 above, at 1056 (emphasis added).
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However, a good tax policy process goes beyond formalized consultation. For 
the GTPP to work well, there need to be coherent policy settings that the 
private sector can buy into. Moreover, a good tax policy process is not 
something that can be captured in a written road-map. It requires willingness 
between the government, officials, and the private sector to truly listen and 
engage. It is critical that the government be open to acting on good 
suggestions put forward by the private sector.
The GTPP has continued to operate largely unscathed under both ‘left of centre’ and 
‘right of centre’ governments, remaining intact for over 20 years with very few instances 
of governments choosing not to follow it.30  This brief overview of the GTPP has 
highlighted the transparency and consultative features of tax policy-making in NZ, as 
well as indicating areas where lawyers may be involved in the tax policy process.  In the 
next section of the paper, the writer explores areas where lawyers are, or have been,
involved in tax policy-making, along with some instances where opportunities for their 
involvement may not have been taken.
III. LAWYERS AND TAX POLICY-MAKING IN NEW ZEALAND
The potential for involvement at the highest level of tax policy-making is through being 
part of the NZ Government, or the select committees that consider draft (tax) legislation.  
In this regard, it is interesting to consider the number of Ministers of Finance and 
Ministers of Revenue that have a legal background since the mid-1980s.  This period 
commenced with the election of the then reforming NZ Labour Government.  Since that 
time, there has not been any Minister of Finance with a legal qualification/background.  
Rather, most have an arts or commerce degree, with the most recent (Hon. Steven Joyce), 
a degree in zoology!  The Minister of Revenue (known for a period as the Treasurer in 
the early MMP days), has had two lawyers, the first being Rt. Hon. Winston Peters in the 
mid-1990s, and the second, Hon. Judith Collins following a Cabinet reshuffle in late 
2016.  Ms. Collins holds a Bachelor of Laws, Master of Laws and a Master of Taxation, 
and is arguably the most qualified person academically to hold the portfolio of Minister 
of Revenue in NZ since the mid-1980s.  Similar to the assessment of those holding the 
  
30 The total most significant instances when the GTPP has not been followed are the introduction of the 39 
percent tax rate in 1999-2000 by then Minister of Finance, Dr Michael Cullen, and the introduction of the 
LTC framework in 2010.  For further discussion, see Vial, n 14 above, and Sawyer, n 3 above.
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position of Minister of Finance, most Ministers of Revenue in NZ have a commerce 
degree and are not qualified lawyers.
Select committees are key parliamentary institutions with which public servants and those 
working in the wider State sector have contact. These committees undertake detailed 
work on a range of different matters on behalf of the NZ House of Representatives, and 
report their findings to it. Specifically the Finance and Expenditure Committee’s (FEC’s) 
remit includes:
• the detailed scrutiny of bills (except appropriation and imprest supply bills, and 
those considered under urgency);
• examination of the estimates of expenditure;
• the review of departmental and agency performance;
• international treaty examinations;
• petitions from NZ citizens; and
• conducting inquiries.
In summary, the FEC examines issues relating to NZ Government finance, revenue and 
taxation. It also looks at the overall performance of the economy.  The FEC serves as the 
equivalent of a Public Accounts Committee (PAC).  However, the FEC’s functions are 
wider than those of a traditional PAC, in that they encompass the audit of the Crown’s 
and departmental financial statements, government finance, revenue and taxation.31
The composition of the FEC since 2000 reveals some interesting finding with respect to 
its combined 70 current and past members.  The current FEC comprises 11 members, and 
has two lawyers (18 percent), including Rt. Hon Winston Peters. Prior to the most recent 
  
31 See further Joachim Wehner, “Principles and Patterns of Financial Scrutiny: Public Accounts Committee 
in the Commonwealth” (2003) 41(3) Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21.  See also Elizabeth
McLeay, “Scrutiny and capacity: An evaluation of the parliamentary committees in the New Zealand 
Parliament”, (2006) 21(1) Australasian Parliamentary Review 158, at 166-168, and Kerry Jacobs, Kate
Jones and David Smith, “Public Accounts Committee in Australasia: the state of play” (2007) 22(1) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 28.  In contrast, Sir Geoffrey Palmer argues that the FEC is “no longer 
the power in the lands that its predecessor, The Public Expenditure Committee, used to be …”; see Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer, “What is Parliament for?” (2011) NZLJ 378 at 384.
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change of membership on 8 February 2017, it had three lawyers (27 percent).  Its current 
Chair, Chris Bishop is also a lawyer.  Of the previous 61 FEC members, 9 have been 
lawyers (a meagre 15 percent).  Of the past FEC members, three have been a Minister of 
Revenue, two a Minister of Finance and one Prime Minister (Rt. Hon John Key).  Few 
past members of the FEC have had extensive experience as a practicing lawyer.  There is 
one notable exception, Hon Kate Wilkinson, who practised as a lawyer for 25 years before 
entering Parliament in 2005 and spending a year on the FEC before retiring from political 
life.  
In addition to the support from public Officials, the FEC has its own specialist tax advisor 
who have been appointed to advise the FEC on a bill-by-bill basis.32  This position has 
been in place since 1992.33  Advisers to select committees generally have a very different 
function from witnesses (such as submitters), and Officials who are responsible for 
drafting the content of a bill.  Advisers will analyse the evidence before the select 
committee, and advise how concerns raised in submissions can be dealt with. They do 
not usually give their advice in public; it is often in the form of a confidential report that
may be released publicly at a later stage. They will generally be present when the select 
committee enters the confidential phase of its deliberations.
The specialist tax adviser to the FEC is usually a very experienced tax lawyer.  Currently 
the FEC’s specialist tax adviser is Therese Turner, and previously it has been David 
McLay and Lindsay McKay.  Harris comments with respect to the role of the specialist 
tax adviser to the FEC:34
The Finance and Expenditure Committee has routinely used a specialist tax 
adviser to provide an independent source of advice for the consideration of 
tax legislation. This has not precluded the receipt of advice from The Treasury 
and the Inland Revenue Department, but has provided the committee with an 
independent sounding board, on technical legal issues, such as avoidance and 
  
32 Appointment is in accordance with protocol; see Hon Margaret Wilson, (Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, NZ), Protocol for the provision of independent specialist assistance to select committees,
J5A (2007); available at: https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
nz/48DBHOH_PAP15218_1/a020737cc00a82bf54b3c519fbe1141cae0e07cc.
33 See Anon, “Finance committee to get own adviser”, (1992) The Dominion, 10 March.
34 Mary Harris, “Keynote Address: Public Servants and Parliament: A New Zealand perspective” (2007) 
22(1) Australasian Parliamentary Review, 9 at 12 (emphasis added).
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evasion and issues of policy and administration where the two departments 
may hold differing views. 
The specialist tax adviser will frequently provide a separate report to the NZ Parliament.  
This report principally considers the comments made by Officials in their report to the 
FEC that have been made after submissions on the bill had been received, along with 
their responses to issues raised.35 Recently the NZLS presented a submission to the 
current Parliamentary Standing Orders select committee urging improvements to the 
submission process.  Key concerns involve providing adequate time for the public to 
make submissions to select committee on bills and allow the select committee more time 
to consider bills, submissions and to report back to Parliament.  Closer scrutiny is urged 
over amendments to bills late in the process, such as via SOPs.  One instance in the area 
of taxation included a proposal to authorise under delegated legislation significant
transitional powers to suspend, amend or override the Tax Administration Act 1994 
(TAA 1994) during the current Business Transformation programme within IR.36
Looking more broadly at the composition of the NZ Parliament, Table 1 provides a 
summary of the previous occupations of MPs from 1996 to 2014:
  
35 For a recent example, see Therese Turner, Report of the Specialist Tax Adviser to the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee on the Taxation (Business Tax, Exchange of Information, and Remedial 
Matters) Bill 2016 (October 2016); Taxation (Business Tax, Exchange of Information, and Remedial 
Matters) Bill 2016; available at: https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
NZ/51SCFE_ADV_00DBHOH_BILL69669_1_A534387/7b6c77dc0c64d739e69b6402a6ab93bf971a533
4.




Table 1: Previous Occupations of MP 1996-2014 (%)37
Occupation 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Businessperson 18 17 19 20 11 20 23
Manager/Administrator 8 6 8 9 16 13 17
Teacher 17 18 18 15 14 7 10
Local Government 3 5 6 3 2 8 9
Lawyer 8 8 10 7 15 10 8
Public servant - - - - - - 7
Farmer 13 12 8 10 8 7 5
Media 3 2 2 1 3 5 5
Consultant 6 8 6 7 2 4 3
Heath Professional - - - - - - 3
Trade Unionist 7 6 8 7 5 4 2
Accountant 4 3 2 2 4 1 1
Engineer 3 3 3 2 2 2 1
Other (or not stated) 11 13 12 17 16 19 6
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Another important committee of the NZ Parliament that has input into tax legislation is 
the Legislation Design and Advisory Committee (LDAC).38  The LDAC’s mandate is to 
promote quality legislation, which it does this in three ways:
1. By providing advice to departments early in the development of policy and 
legislation to resolve problems in the design of legislation and to identify potential 
public and constitutional law issues.
  
37 Source: NZ Parliamentary Service, Final Results for the 2014 New Zealand General Election, 
Parliamentary Library Research Papers 2015/01 (2015); available at: 
https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
NZ/00PLLawRP2015011/1cb65e1e0919e68b3048392636652383f18cd7c1.  Note: This covers all MPs 
elected under NZ’s MMP election system since 1996.  Businessperson includes company directors, the 
self-employed, real estate agents, investment bankers and chairpersons. ‘Teacher’ includes lecturers and 
principals. The category of ‘manager/administrator’ includes financial administrator, voluntary sector 
administrator, and executive officers of public agencies. ‘Other’ includes those working for nongovernment 
organisations, and MPs whose previous occupation is publicly unavailable. Prior to 2014, ‘Public servants’ 
and ‘health professionals’ were included in the ‘Other’ category.  Main sources are Statistics NZ, NZ 
Official Yearbook, and MPs’ biographies as listed on political party websites.  Data for 2017 should be 
known once the composition of the government is determined.
38 For further details of the activities of the LDAC, see http://www.ldac.org.nz/.
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2. By setting standards through the publication of guidelines (endorsed by Cabinet) 
and the supporting manual for lawyers and policy advisors engaged in designing, 
developing and drafting legislation.
3. By scrutinising NZ Government bills that come before NZ Parliament.
The LDAC is largely comprised of lawyers.  Importantly, it is not concerned with the 
policy objectives of legislation; its focus is on ‘good’ legislative practice and public law 
issues.  Its input into tax law drafting is indirect at most, given the input of the IR into tax 
law drafting.
The Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO) has the responsibility for drafting legislation to 
support the NZ Government's legislative programme.39  Its goal is to ensure legislation 
that is effective, clear, consistent with other legislation, and adheres to legal principles.  
However, unique to NZ within common law jurisdictions, tax legislation is not drafted 
by the PCO but within the IR by the Policy and Strategy Group (PSG, previously Policy 
Advice Division).  In addition to drafting legislation and other tax materials, the PSG, 
jointly with the NZ Treasury, advises the NZ Government on all aspects of tax law and 
reform, and on social policy measures that interact with the tax system.  This forms part 
of the contestable policy paradigm that operates in NZ.  More generally, the role of the 
PSG is to:
• draft tax legislation (including regulations);
• forecast tax revenues; and
• negotiate, interpret and maintain NZ’s network of double tax agreements (DTAs) 
with other countries.
Within the IR, two senior positions are held by lawyers.  The Acting Deputy 
Commissioner, Policy and Strategy (David Carrigan), and the lead for NZ’s international 
tax portfolio, Carmel Peters, come with considerable experience as tax lawyers.  Within 
the IR most lawyers are located in the Office of the Chief Tax Counsel (OCTC).  The 
OCTC’s function is to maintain taxpayer confidence in the NZ tax system by providing 
guidance on the correct interpretation of the Inland Revenue Acts and other relevant laws, 
  
39 For further details on the PCO, see: http://www.pco.parliament.govt.nz/.
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and by considering case law through the disputes process.  Many other lawyers within 
the IR work in the Legal and Technical Services Group (LTSG), which has a number of 
key functions, namely:40
• providing independent advice and support services to assist in the resolution of 
complex tax issues (some which include social policy matters);
• litigating and prosecuting where enforcement is considered necessary;
• representing the Service Delivery Group and other business groups within IR in 
identifying and resolving issues arising from new legislation, court cases and 
through tax disputes; and
• developing and monitoring various types of IR taxpayer guidance, including 
Standard Practice Statements, Operational Statements, and Depreciation 
Determinations.
Other lawyers within the IR are involved in undertaking investigations and audits of 
taxpayers, but do not have a direct influence on tax policy.  However, their 
recommendations may indirectly lead to future tax policy changes.
The previous discussion is not reflective of tax policy in NZ prior to the mid-1990s.  Prior 
to the introduction of the GTPP, the development of tax policy in NZ was the 
responsibility of the NZ Treasury.  This was a small group of policy analysts, the vast 
majority of which were economists.  The role of the IR was then similar to the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO), largely that of the administration of the tax system, with the exception 
of having the responsibility for drafting legislation.41  Since the introduction of the GTPP, 
the IR has become the principal government agency responsibility of tax policy, 
supported by the NZ Treasury. 
Collectively the IR and NZ Treasury, in working together, have been successful in NZ in 
tax policy development.  This is an unusual allegiance within common law countries, so 
what makes joint tax policy work in NZ?  Essentially, it reflects a good working 
  
40 See further: http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/who-we-are/structure/tlsg/.
41 See further Brian J Arnold, “The Process of Tax Policy Formulation in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand” (1990) 7 Australian Tax Forum 379.
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relationship and common understanding of what constitutes an effective tax system, 
namely: the tax mix; tax design; and tax administration.  In NZ this is underpinned by 
taking a principled approach to policy development, namely through a combination of 
the BBLR, the GTPP, the RTYWP, and evidence-based advice.
Outside of the public sector, there has been involvement in tax policy by lawyers through 
a number of mechanisms. The most notable areas are through making submissions on 
tax bills, Officials issues papers (and other forms of proposed policy change 
notifications), and to various tax reviews.  The two most prolific submitters on tax policy 
proposals and bills are Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ –
formerly New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants - NZICA) and the NZLS.  Both 
of these bodies work on behalf of their constituent members, with CA-ANZ representing 
around 33,000 NZ members (out of a combined 130,000 Australasian members), and the 
NZLS with approximately 13,000 members. CA-ANZ has one lawyer as part of its 
specialist in-house tax team, as well as one lawyer on its wider Tax Advisory Group
(formerly known as the National Tax Committee).  Unsurprisingly, the NZLS’s Tax Law 
Committee, which was established in 1988, comprises only senior tax lawyers (14 in 
total), and has a strong working relationship with the IR.
Turning now to reviewing the role of lawyers with tax review bodies and committees, the 
first such review under BBLR was the Tax Review 2001.42 This group was set up by 
then Minister of Finance, Dr Michael Cullen, and comprised five members, one of which 
was a practising lawyer (who now works for the IR).  The Tax Review 2001 issued both 
an interim and final report (following the consideration of submissions), although almost 
all of its recommendations were not taken up by the NZ Government at the time.  
Like most previous reviews of the NZ tax system, the Tax Review 2001 was not able to 
set its own agenda.  For instance, three of the four members of the Committee of Experts 
  
42 The Tax Review 2001 (also known as the McLeod Review) was established by the NZ Government in 
2001 to carry out a public review into the tax system. The functions of the Tax Review 2001 were to: 
examine and inquire into the structure and effects of the tax system in NZ; to formulate proposals for 
improving that system, either by way of making changes to the system, abolishing any existing form of tax, 
or introducing new forms of tax; and to report to the NZ Parliament through the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Revenue and the Minister of Economic Development. The terms of reference were set within 
the constraints of maintaining revenue neutrality with any recommendations for change; available at 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/reviews-consultation/taxreview2001, (October 8, 2015).
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on Tax Compliance,43 which was established in 1998, were senior tax lawyers and a 
judge.  Furthermore, the Inquiry into the Powers and Operations of the Inland Revenue 
Department,44 in 1998, had two of its twelve members with a legal background. Of the 
remaining eleven consultative-type committees established since 1998, all except two 
have had a minority of their members who were lawyers.45 The other two consultative-
type committees had no lawyers as members.
One recent instance where lawyers have had a critical but small role in tax policy 
development was through the TWG.  The writer has previously discussed46 the 
establishment of the TWG in 2009, an independent group comprising experts from 
academia, IR, NZ Treasury and tax practice, to undertake a review of the NZ tax system 
from a core principles policy-focused perspective.47 While the TWG received resource 
support from the IR and the NZ Treasury, it operated separately from, and outside of, the 
‘government appointed committee’ framework of earlier tax reviews.48 Specifically, the 
TWG had three tax lawyers within its thirteen members, along with two senior IR 
officials, who were tax lawyers, providing support.  The NZ Treasury officials were 
economists.  
The TWG, as part of its structural review of the NZ tax system, established six principles 
for reform, namely: the overall coherence of the system; efficiency and growth; equity 
and fairness; revenue integrity; fiscal cost; and compliance and administration costs.  
  
43 Committee of Experts on Tax Compliance, Tax Compliance: A Report to the Treasurer and Minister of 
Revenue by a Committee of Experts on Tax Compliance (NZ Government, December 1998).
44 Finance and Expenditure Committee, Inquiry into the Powers and Operations of the Inland Revenue 
Department: Report of the Finance and Expenditure Committee (NZ Parliament, October 1998).
45 These committees that had senior tax lawyers/judges as members were: Consultative Committee on the 
Taxation of Income from Capital (The Valabh Committee – 1990-1991); Tax Simplification Consultative 
Committee (1990); Consultative Committee on the Valuation of Livestock for Tax Purposes (1992); 
Organisational Review Committee (Richardson Committee – 1994 – this Committee also devised the 
GTPP); Working Party on the Re-Organisation of the Income Tax Act 1976 (1993); Working Group on the 
Taxation of Life Insurance and Superannuation Fund Savings (1997); Law Commission (effectively an 
independent Crown Entity that reviews the law and makes recommendations for improvement to the NZ 
Government – in 2000 it examined legal professional privilege and taxation); Savings Product Working 
Group (2004); and the Rewrite Advisory Panel (1995 to 2014).
46 See Adrian Sawyer, “Moving on from the Tax Legislation Rewrite Projects: A Comparison of New 
Zealand Tax Working Group/Generic Tax Policy Process and the United Kingdom Office of Tax 
Simplification”, [2013] 3 BTR, 321.
47 Details of independent, Inland Revenue and Treasury members of the TWG can be found at, The Centre 
for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research. Details of the number of experts who assisted the 
TWG are also provided.
48 These operate within the External Input phase of the GTPP.
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Following its analysis, the TWG made a number of significant recommendations for 
reform, including major changes to tax rates, structures and bases.49  In the 2010 Budget 
the NZ Government announced a major overhaul of the NZ tax system, adopting many 
of the recommendations of the TWG.50  This was the most significant overhaul of the NZ 
tax system in 25 years.
With respect to tax legislation developed since 2000, submitters on the 40 plus major tax 
bills have, in almost every instance, included submissions from major law firms, and in 
some instances, from senior lawyers in a personal capacity. This is in addition to the 
NZLS that has made submissions on all except one major tax bill during this period.51
In terms of lawyers acting as commentators providing information in a digestible format 
for the general public, the media rarely draws upon the services of qualified lawyers in 
the area of taxation.  However, experienced lawyers are, on occasion, called upon to 
provide information and comment to support journalists in compiling their media items.  
One area where lawyers do provide a more general commentary on tax policy is through 
their firm’s client newsletters, most of which are publicly available.  All of the NZ’s 
major law firms are involved, to varying degrees, in providing this form of service to 
assist in making tax policy and legislative change more accessible to the general public.  
The paper now turns to reviewing the level of inclusion of legal and other theoretical 
approaches in tax policy development in NZ. 
IV. INSTANCES OF INCLUSION OF LEGAL AND OTHER THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN 
TAX POLICY-MAKING DESIGN IN NEW ZEALAND
As a starting point, it is useful to have an understanding of the theoretical concepts that 
underlie NZ tax policy.  In this regard the prevailing doctrine that applies with respect to 
  
49 The recommendations were included in the TWG’s January 2010 report which is publicly available; see, 
The Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, “VUW Tax Working Group”,
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg.
50 For details of the New Zealand Budget 2010 announcements, see: 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2010. 
51 Law firms and organisations (excluding the NZLS) that have made a submission on more than three tax 
bills are: Russell McVeagh (17); Minter Ellison Rudd Watts (13); Chapman Tripp (12); Bell Gully (6); 
Simpson Grierson (3); and DLA Piper/Phillips Fox (3).  Other legal organisations that have made two or 
more submissions include: Whitireia Community Law Centre (4); Dunedin Community Law Centre (3); 
and the Legislation Advisory Committee (3).
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the managing the NZ economy is one of neoliberalism, similar to many other developed 
countries.  Neoliberalism, as a concept, engenders a broad spectrum of reactions, ranging 
from general embracing, or reluctant acceptance, to outright opposition.  It is an approach 
in which the control of economic factors is shifted from the public sector to the private 
sector. YourNZ offers the following definition of neoliberalism:52
Drawing upon principles of neoclassical economics, neoliberalism suggests 
that governments reduce deficit spending, limit subsidies, reform tax law to 
broaden the tax base, remove fixed exchange rates, open up markets to trade 
by limiting protectionism, privatize state-run businesses, allow private 
property and back deregulation.
Christensen argues that NZ is an example of an ‘extreme’ form of neoliberalism, 
concluding:53
[W]e have argued that the neo-liberal tax reforms in New Zealand in the 1980s 
and in 2010 are best understood as the product of autonomous bureaucratic 
action. In both reform processes we found that the goals and ideas for reform 
came from bureaucratic organizations rather than from politicians, that 
bureaucrats took an activist role in policy-making, and that the policy 
preferences of politicians changed considerably as a consequence of 
bureaucratic policy advocacy. The ideas, role and influence of bureaucrats 
were thus the most important factors for explaining that New Zealand moved 
very far in the direction of low rates, broad bases and neutrality in tax policy.
The author is supportive of a review of the dominant neoliberal paradigm through an 
informed debate, potentially led by a working group similar to the TWG.  In this regard, 
a ‘rebalancing’ of the dominant players through the inclusion of more lawyers (and 
potentially sociologists and others professionals), at the expense of some of the 
economists, would be a positive step forward in examining NZ’s neoliberal paradigm.
  
52 See further: https://yournz.org/2012/06/14/what-is-neoliberalism/ (emphasis added).
53 Johan Christensen, “Bringing the bureaucrats back in: Neo-liberal tax reform in New Zealand” (2012) 
32(2) Journal of Public Policy 141, at 164 (emphasis added).
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Turning now to the inclusion of legal and other theoretical approaches in tax policy, there 
is little publicly available evidence of the direct inclusion of such approaches in tax policy 
decision making in NZ, with some notable exceptions.  The Tax Review 2001 and TWG 
are arguably the most notable recent instances where input from the specialist support 
personnel and submissions, incorporated economic analyses advocating for changes in 
policy (such as to tax owner-occupiers of houses in the Tax Review 2001).  Such ‘radical’ 
proposals have engaged the public to express their opposition to them, with the extent of 
such opposition usually resulting in these proposals failing to see the ‘light of day’.  Their 
endorsement by the NZ government of the time could be considered to be ‘political 
suicide’.  
One theoretical approach to tax policy development that has endured since the mid-1990s 
is the BBLR.  Under the BBLR, what is seen as an appropriate balance of economic 
theory and practical administrative efficiency for NZ appears to have been achieved.  As 
a consequence the basis of the BBLR has operated without significant amendment over 
the last 30 years.  Indeed, reviews of taxation, including the Tax Review 2001 and the 
TWG Group have argued that there should be a high burden of proof before moving away 
from the current BBLR principles.
The hallmarks of tax policy development in NZ are transparency and consultation.  While 
the GTPP facilitates the use of economic and other theories in the strategic phase, the 
remainder of the GTPP is premised on tax policy and legislative design that incorporates 
a blend of policy based on the BBLR paradigm, and practical administrative reality.  
Collectively these are brought to the fore through the consultation process that involves 
numerous tax lawyers and legal firms.  The GTPP provides a clear framework which is 
an important part of its success.  Tax reform debates, which will usually involve lawyers, 
can therefore be principled, and comment on whether or not tax changes are consistent 
with the BBLR’s framework.  
Wales and Wales, in their initial report on best practice tax policy development, state:54
  
54 Christopher J Wales and Christopher P Wales, Structures, processes and governance in tax policy-
making: an initial report (Economic and Social Research Council & said Business School, Oxford, UK, 
2012), at 12 and 13.
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We recommend that greater consideration should be given to the respective 
roles of lawyers, economists and generalists within the policy-making process 
and to the role of those with other specialised professional training, such as 
accountants. … We recommend that academic institutions should play a 
larger role in providing early stage analysis of tax proposals, particularly 
where government resources are limited.
Wales and Wales also observe that since the mid-1990s, the IR has been particularly 
strong with respect to tax policy-making, and the NZ Treasury ‘weak’.  In many respects 
this may account for the relatively minimal instances of explicit adoption of economic 
theory in tax policy-making, and a greater emphasis on administrative efficiency.  Wales 
and Wales later state:55
The changes in both policy and policy-making processes that took place in the 
mid-1990s left Inland Revenue institutionally powerful. Ever since then, the 
department has been in a strong position to uphold principles of consistency 
and neutrality in the system and to resist alternative strategies. The strength 
of its position was reinforced by the firm grip of a particular senior official in 
Inland Revenue. At the time of our visit, we felt there was a new assertiveness 
among Treasury policy-makers that might lead to a re-balancing. However, 
Inland Revenue enjoyed the confidence of ministers and officials, and were 
able to use that to effect in policy discussions.
Prior analysis has reviewed the comments on the contributions of the TWG within the 
GTPP environment, including from those involved either as members of the GTPP (the 
Chair, Professor Bob Buckle), advisors (for example, Professor Norman Gemmell) and 
expert consultants (for example, Professor John Creedy). As the writer has previously 
observed,56 collectively these academics emphasise the importance of the 
interdisciplinary backgrounds and expertise of those involved, the attempt to rationalise 
tax policy debate, and engaging the public in the debate. However, not one of these three 
academics are legally qualified; their main area of expertise is within the discipline of 
economics.  A major constraining factor with most tax reviews, the TWG being no 
  
55 Wales and Wales, n 54 above, at 39 (emphasis added).
56 See Sawyer, n 46 above, at 322–327.
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exception, is the revenue neutral constraint placed on the package of recommendations 
able to be made by these reviews. 
Little et al.57 argue that the TWG proved to be a considerable success, as it was an open 
forum for debate, with the papers provided to meetings and a summary of the debates 
published, and all reasonable steps taken to inform the wider public of the key tax policy 
issues.  The media is also seen as playing a key role in tax policy matters in NZ, assisting 
with ensuring the BBLR framework is not been departed from without justifiable 
reason.58  Nevertheless, the extent of the media’s involvement in raising matters of tax 
policy is most notable in the lead up to a general election and when a controversial tax 
proposal is floated.59
This open approach to tax policy formation also works well from the NZ Government’s 
perspective, with Wales and Wales observing:60
“It allowed possible tax changes to be aired publicly and debated openly, and 
it brought the academic community into important tax policy debates. 
However, a large element in its success was the cooperation and engagement 
of key tax practitioners. This was built on the engagement and cooperation 
that had been built up through many years of working with the GTPP.”
Wales and Wales then comment with respect to the TWG:61
The group was given public backing after the government was criticised for 
not establishing a review like that just held in Australia. The support given by 
the government to the group gave them a national importance without 
imposing government control. Instead of preventing certain options being 
considered; the government made it clear that they would not be ruling out 
any options until the report was complete, and that whilst officials participated 
  
57 See Little et al., n 24 above, at 1052.
58 Little et al, n 24 above, at 1053.
59 A recent example of a controversial proposal is the debate over a capital gains tax for NZ; see for 
example, the references to the media in the work by: Jonathan Barrett and John Veal, “Equity versus 
Political Suicide: Framing the Capital Gains Tax Debate in the New Zealand Print Media” (2013) 19 
NZJTLP 91.
60 Little et al, n 24 above, at 1053 (emphasis added).
61 Wales and Wales, n 54 above, at 58.
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in the group they had no final say over its conclusions. In fact, government 
officials were not only allowed to attend group meetings, they were 
encouraged to think and speak freely, to the extent that officials could publicly 
disagree with each other about the future of the tax system.
With respect to the GTPP, Wales and Wales observe:62
Within the Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP) academia has good 
opportunities to contribute effectively. Communication with the government 
is regular and high-level. External experts are not only consulted early into 
the development of tax policy, but are able to see government officials at any 
time to express concern about an element of the tax system. Discussion with 
external experts is a recognised step in policy development through the GTPP. 
Tax academics have not only had the opportunity to make an impact on policy 
development in New Zealand, they also make good use of it. Intellectual 
transmission is fluid. The Treasury and the Inland Revenue Department 
recognise that they lack internal resources and appear to welcome input on 
both a general level and on specific matters. It was an academic who was 
invited to lead the Tax Working Group that carried out what was regarded in 
New Zealand as a very successful review of the New Zealand tax system.
Wales and Wales firmly endorse NZ’s GTPP, stating:63
New Zealand’s Generic Tax Policy Process is perhaps the best example of 
how policy ought to be documented. Acknowledging that several phases of 
policy development were inadequate, a senior and experienced policy maker 
was commissioned to create a new model of tax policy development with a 
group of distinguished and strong-minded individuals in support. We believe 
that other governments could usefully follow this example.
While Wales and Wales are very complimentary about NZ’s GTPP, recommending it as 
a useful example to other governments, it should be remembered that the GTPP (as set 
out), is only likely to work in a country like New Zealand.  Should it be considered 
  
62 Wales and Wales, n 54 above, at 79-80 (emphasis added).
63 Wales and Wales, n 54 above, at 158 (emphasis added).
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elsewhere, apart from adaptation to fit the political and regulatory environment of a 
jurisdiction, it is only likely to have a chance of being successful, in the author’s view, if 
that jurisdiction has consultation and transparency as the hallmarks of its tax policy-
making process.   
Overall, what has proven to be successful in tax policy development in NZ is the clear 
structure evident in the GTPP, the platforms of transparency and consultation, and active 
involvement of the tax community (including tax lawyers) in the process at all levels.  
This ranges from within the Executive and parliamentary branches of the NZ government, 
to serving on tax review bodies and making numerous submissions on bills and other 
policy documents.  With a relatively small specialist tax community in NZ, this has placed 
a sizeable burden on a relatively small number of tax experts to engage in the consultation 
process.  These tax experts are predominately accountants rather than lawyers.  
Alternatively, rather than viewing the specialist tax community as being under pressure,  
there is a potential danger of regulatory capture where such a small group of government 
officials, private sector practitioners and academics regularly meet to ‘make’ policy. This 
view could give rise to the argument that is a rather exclusive club of tax grandees, rather 
than a small overworked group. The FEC, amongst others, needs to maintain a close 
watch over the consultation and policy-making process.  
There is also relatively little evidence of legal or other theoretical approaches being 
overtly incorporated into tax policy design, other than through various consultative and 
tax review bodies. Perhaps with the almost universal acceptance of the concepts behind 
BBLR across the political spectrum, the debate over which theoretical approaches to 
apply (if any) is largely settled.  This could change should the BBLR come under 
significant pressure with future governments.
V. PROVIDING CONTEXT – A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND’S TAX 
POLICY PROCESS
As noted earlier in the paper, the Republic of Ireland is a similar size nation (population 
wise) to NZ.  It operates under a Westminster-type parliamentary system, and 
incorporates consultation into its law making process, albeit in a different manner to NZ.  
Unlike NZ, there is no equivalent to the GTPP, and Ireland does not operate formally 
under a BBLR-type platform.  Ireland is well known internationally for its competitive 
30
corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent, making it a popular location for MNEs to set up their 
headquarters.64  Ireland is also ‘constrained’ through its membership of the EU in that it 
needs to ensure it meets all of its EU obligations.  
Leaving aside the debate over Ireland’s corporate tax system, Ireland operates an EU-
style VAT, along with an income tax that has similarities to NZ in terms of family 
support, but with greater use of tax credits and deductions.65  The legislative process in 
Ireland is set out in Figure 2.
  
64 This system has come under scrutiny following an investigation by the European Commission (EC), 
which concluded in August 2016 that Ireland granted undue tax benefits of up to €13 billion to Apple Inc. 
Such benefits are illegal under EU State Aid Rules, because it allowed Apple to pay substantially less tax 
than other businesses. Ireland must now recover the illegal aid.  See further: European Commission, Press 
release: State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion (Brussels, 30 August 
2016); available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm.  While Ireland is entitled to 
recoup this money, the Irish Government has indicated that it does not intend to do so.  It has lodged an 
appeal, accusing the EC of overstepping its powers, infringing on national sovereignty and 
misunderstanding the law by ordering Ireland to claw back taxes from Apple of up to €13 billion, plus 
interest.  See further: http://www.politico.eu/article/ireland-says-eu-exceeded-powers-in-apple-case/.
65 There are plans for reform of the Irish income tax system; see Tax Policy Division, Income Tax Reform 
Plan (July 2016, An Roinn Airgeadais, Department of Finance).
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Figure 2: How laws are made in Ireland
The key player in tax policy development in Ireland is the Department of Finance. The 
department manages the Finance Bill process, coordinates the Tax Strategy Group (TSG) 
and has oversight for the Irish Government’s tax policy objectives.  The TSG is an 
interdepartmental committee chaired by the Department of Finance, with membership 
comprising senior officials and advisors from various departments and the Revenue 
Commissioners.  While the TSG has no decision making powers, it provides a number of 
policy papers that are published in advance of the annual budget.  It is similar to (but with 
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internal membership only) the TWG in NZ, although it has the advantage of a continued 
existence, thereby enabling it to be utilised to look at tax policy when necessary.  
Within the wider Department of Finance, submissions are able to be received from 
individuals and organisations ahead of the annual budget planning process; these 
submissions may inform aspects of the content of the budget.66  It is not clear from 
publicly available material as to the composition of these various groups in terms of those 
members who have a legal background.  
Donal de Buitleir of the Irish Fiscal Policy Research Centre comments:67
In an area where the responsibilities of the Department of Finance and the 
Revenue Commissioners are not precisely defined, much depends on the 
personality and ideas of the leading civil servants. The working relationship 
between them seems unusually close, if informal. Broadly speaking, while the 
Department of Finance carries the last word on policy matters, the Revenue 
Commissioners have a substantial input and carry considerable weight. The 
Revenue Commissioners have substantial responsibility for the 
implementation and administration of any tax change and supply all the
technical detail, while the Department of Finance has the final say on broad 
policy matters.
The similarities here with the NZ Treasury and IR regarding a close working relations 
are notable, although the respective roles in NZ are more clearly defined.  An information 
sharing/liaison group comprising senior officials from the Department of Finance and the 
Chairman of Revenue and the two Commissioners from the Irish Inland Revenue meet 
several times a year to exchange high level policy relevant information of mutual interest 
to the two organisations. As the Irish Inland Revenue is statutorily independent in its 
administration of the tax system, no individual tax cases are discussed.
  
66 For a more in-depth analysis of the legislative process in Ireland, see Revenue Commissioners, Guide to 
the Legislative Process (Irish Government, May 2016). 
67 Donald de Buitlei, “The role of the revenue department in policy-making”, in Structures, Processes and 
Governance in Tax Policy-Making: An Initial Report, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, (8-
9 March, 2012). These are notes made by de Buitlei (emphasis added).
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Outside of the bureaucracy, special interest groups, such as the Irish Business and 
Employer’s Confederation (IBEC), exert a significant influence on Irish taxation policy.  
This is particularly focussed on the Pre-Budget Submissions process, a system that is 
significantly different to that which operates in NZ (where the government drives the 
budget process in confidence with a number of releases pre-delivery).  A number of issues 
that have been introduced via the budget process have come from members of the public 
through submissions as part of this consultation process.
Legislation in Ireland is drafted by the Office of the Parliamentary Council (OPC), 
including tax legislation.68  Its major input is to draft the annual Finance Bill.  
Membership unsurprisingly is dominated by lawyers.  Specifically, when a decision has 
been obtained from the Minister, they will request the Attorney General to arrange for 
the drafting of a bill. This request is then be sent to the Group Manager in the OPC whose 
group deals with requests from the relevant department. The Group Manager will then 
assign a Parliamentary Counsel to draft the bill.  Lawyers play a pivotal role in the OPC.
Another important body is the Government Legislation Committee (GLC),69 whose 
members include the Attorney General, the Chief Parliamentary Counsel, the Programme 
Managers of the main parties in Irish Government, the Leader of Seanad Éireann (Upper 
House of the Irish Parliament) and representatives of the Department of the Taoiseach 
and the OPC. Lawyers would be expected to play a key role in the GLC.  The OPC works 
closely with the GLC in ensuring that the Irish Government’s legislation programme is 
implemented. The GLC assists the Irish Government in fixing legislative priorities for 
the forthcoming parliamentary session (such as by recommending the level of priority for 
drafting various bills), and oversees the implementation of the government’s legislation 
programme. 
Before the commencement of each Dáil session and following internal review, the Irish 
Government publishes a press release which sets out its legislative priorities for that 
session. The legislative priorities set out in the press release determine the work 
programme for the OPC for the Dáil session concerned.  In part this is similar to the 
  
68 For further details on the OPC, see: http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/pc/pc.html. As noted earlier, in NZ 
the IR drafts tax legislation.
69 For further details on the GLC, see: http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/pc/pc_govleg.html.
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RTYWP that the IR issues every 12-18 months, although this is only in relation to tax 
policy. 
The Irish approach to tax policy development has a number of deficiencies.  Wales and 
Wales70 argue that the ‘rushed’ budget policy process, coupled with the associated 
secrecy, lack of strong external institutions focussing on tax policy, and limited 
consultation, is inhibiting the quality of the resulting legislation.  That said, the level of 
contact with the Department of Finance and overall public awareness of tax issues is 
considered to be very good.  On the other hand, Irish parliamentary committees are 
considered to be particularly weak, and arguably were weakened even further by the 
Supreme Court decision in the Abbeylara case.71  In contrast, the FEC in NZ has a major 
role in reviewing draft legislation and scrutinizing official’s actions. 
In terms of the number of lawyers involved in the two houses  the Dáil and the Seanad -
from the patchy information provided in the register of members interests for each house, 
6 of the 158 Dáil and 8 of the 60 Seanad self-declared themselves to be a lawyer as their 
occupation.72  The extent to which key personnel in the various Irish Government 
departments are lawyers is not clear from publicly available evidence.  Lawyers and legal 
firms have been prominent in providing submissions on tax policy proposals.
VI. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In response to the question: “Do lawyers make a distinctive contribution to tax policy-
making?” the NZ experience would suggest lawyers have made a significant contribution.  
This needs to be viewed in the context of tax policy-making in NZ under the GTPP which 
is a unique and distinctive model.  This in itself would suggest that the contributions of 
lawyers to tax policy-making in NZ should be distinctive with respect to lawyers in other 
jurisdictions, such as in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK).  Comparing 
NZ with Ireland, a similar size jurisdiction to NZ with a Westminster-style parliament, 
  
70 Wales and Wales, n 54 above, at 182.
71 The Irish Supreme Court in its 2001judgment in the Abbeylara case decided the Irish Constitution gave 
no power to the Oireachtas to hold inquiries in which the findings could adversely affect private individuals.  
A referendum was held in 2011 which proved unsuccessful in overturning this decision.  See further: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/ParliamentaryInquiries/Abbeylara.htm.
72 See further: http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/tdssenators/registerofmembersinterests/.
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the level of contribution of lawyers in NZ to tax policy would appear to be higher, 
including input via the consultation process.
The significant role of the IR, as compared to the NZ Treasury, in developing and 
managing tax policy, has reduced the influence of NZ Treasury economists.  This may 
be a factor in the minimal overt use of economic and other theories being applied when 
developing tax policy. Currently the PSG within the IR is led by a lawyer; it also includes 
a number of lawyers, accountants and economists. The FEC has a specialist tax adviser 
who is a lawyer. Thus lawyers with tax experience are prominent and active at the highest 
levels of tax policy development in NZ.  This is not such a strong feature of the Irish 
approach to tax policy development.
However, does this mean that lawyers make a distinctive contribution to tax policy in 
New Zealand vis-à-vis other contributors, such as accountants and economists?  In this 
regard, it would be fair to say that given the dominance of the tax profession by 
accountants, the extent of lawyers’ involvement is severely constrained.  Outside of the 
NZLS’s Tax Law Committee and a number of large law firms which have a specialist tax 
area of practice, lawyers do not play a large role in tax policy development in NZ.  
Accounting firms (who would usually have a number of tax lawyers on staff), in terms of 
quantum, are the major contributors.  That said, both lawyers and accountants frequently 
have similar concerns over the direction of tax policy and its implementation, and in that 
sense offer complementary advice to the NZ Government and Officials.  In Ireland, 
through the pre-Budget submissions process, lobby groups including lawyers, can 
potentially have an influence on the content of the annual Budget and associated Finance 
Bill.
The extent to which legal and other theoretical approaches are directly incorporated into 
tax policy design, the evidence would suggest this is minimal; the exceptions to this are
the consultative committees and tax review bodies.  What not should be lost here is that 
tax policy in NZ is premised on the BBLR, which in itself, is based on economic theory 
modified to an extent to ensure administrative efficiencies and a degree of practicality are 
achieved.  Furthermore, through the consultation process, academics are encouraged and 
on occasions, have provided advice to tax policy development that incorporates 
theoretical dimensions.  Such advice has principally come from economists and as such, 
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there is minimal legal theory involved.  Successful tax reform requires goodwill and co-
operation from all involved in the tax reform process; these are evident in NZ.  
While it may be stating the obvious, NZ’s legal system works on a number of well-
established principles, including applying the rule of law, operating under a traditional 
Westminster form of parliamentary governance, and adopting the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.  While not directly related to taxation, these concepts underpin the 
way in which tax policy is developed in NZ, and therefore indirectly demonstrate the 
incorporation of legal theories into tax policy development.  In many ways this statement 
can also be used to summarise the approach to tax policy in Ireland, although there is 
much less of a focus on BBLR and a greater degree of outside influence, such as through 
the EU.  
Furthermore, NZ taxpayers appear to be overall ambivalent towards neo-liberal economic 
policy which has underpinned much of the tax system since the mid-1980s.  In this regard, 
the opportunity for alternative economic and social policy theories to permeate the NZ 
tax policy scene has been very limited.  Indeed, the TWG’s core principles, along with 
its endorsement of the BBLR, continue to form the foundations for tax policy 
development in NZ.  With the potential for income tax reform in Ireland, and the need to 
address the ongoing publicity over the nation’s approach to corporate tax policy post the 
EC findings over Apple, there is the potential for change.  Certainly with corporate tax, 
the neoliberal philosophy is at the forefront in Ireland through the very low 12.5 percent 
nominal rate.
Lawyers, regardless of their area of contribution to tax policy (such as through being in 
the Legislature, bureaucracy, or the private sector) are premised, by necessity, to offer 
their advice without really questioning these fundamental principles.  Their input relates 
more to highlighting the practical implications and best practice approaches to developing 
tax policy, and the subsequent conversion of policy into draft legislation (and other forms 
of regulation), when engaging in the consultation process. The level of input from (legal)
academics is minimal, which is not surprising given the relatively small number actively 
involved in tax-related research and provision of advice to the NZ Government and 
Officials.  Nonetheless, their input is important in offering further perspectives on tax 
policy development. 
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The analysis in this paper comes with a number of limitations, with the most significant 
being that it seeks to provide an overview of how lawyers have made a (distinctive) 
contribution to tax policy in NZ.  It has not sought to examine the extent to which lawyers’ 
contributions have had a significant impact on reshaping tax policy and its 
implementation.  Given the nature of tax policy development, it would be extremely 
difficult to identify their impact.  Thus while this would be an enormous undertaking, it 
is an area that could be considered in future research.  Undoubtedly, the analysis in this 
paper will have overlooked some areas where lawyers in NZ make a contribution to tax 
policy but these are likely to be “on the margin”.  It is also acknowledged that with less 
publicly available data, the degree of involvement of lawyers in Ireland may be 
underestimated in this paper.
A further limitation is that this paper has left out of its scope an analysis of the extent to 
which the judiciary, in their judgments, have an indirect influence on future tax policy
when they identify unintended consequences of legislation.  Future research could also 
take a more critical approach as to whether the current BBLR model is optimally applied 
in a NZ context, such as whether the base can be further broadened to include other areas 
of the economy, the most notable being introducing a comprehensive CGT. 
Overall, tax policy formulation and development works reasonably well in NZ.  
Important to this is the ‘formalised’ but not legislated for GTPP.  It is critical to have a 
policy framework that the private sector ‘buys into’, which is supported by the evidence 
in NZ.  On the ‘flip side’, it is also critical that Officials are willing to take on board good 
ideas that emerge from the private sector, including those from lawyers.  In an Irish 
context, there would appear to be room for improvement in terms of tax policy 
formulation and development. 
To conclude, lawyers in NZ have made, and are expected to continue to make, an 
important, but not necessarily distinctive, contribution to tax policy as compared to 
accountants for example.  This statement is made in the context of the BBLR and GTPP 
shaping the overall economic theories and policy development in NZ.  Nevertheless, NZ 
tax policy would the worse off if lawyers did not continue to be actively involved in 
contributing to tax policy development.  The same comment can also be said for Ireland.
